

...be summarized briefly.⁵⁵ In the 28 months of its operation (November 1944 through March 1947) 43 clubs, canteens, recreation halls, and rest centers were operated by the Club and Recreation Division. Most of these were open throughout the day and in the evening, though the canteens at two airstrips were operated by Red Cross workers from 11 at night to 8 and 9 in the morning, when the volunteers from the chapter moved in. Some of these recreation rooms were open for only two months. Others operated for 15 or 16 months, and still another was open after the program terminated officially. The total life of these 43 clubs was 280 months. The club directors estimated that 8,308,150 persons used the clubs, though these estimates were not made by methods satisfactory to statisticians.

The Landings

The last two great landings in the Pacific north of the Philippines were on the rocky little island of Iwo Jima, 640 miles from Japan, and on the populous island of Okinawa, 350 miles from Japan (both distances by air).⁵⁶ Although the men who participated in these landings were drawn from several parts of the Pacific, the bulk of them came from the units stationed in Hawaii or Guam, and the Red Cross planning of them was in Honolulu. Both of these landings were planned at the same time. Consequently, the allocation of supplies was difficult.

Iwo Jima, February 19, 1945

Iwo Jima is a small heap of volcanic ash and rubble 8 miles long and 5 miles wide at its greatest dimensions and containing approximately 30 square miles of surface. After 26 days of fighting the American troops suffered 20,196 casualties.⁵⁷

Although the Red Cross staff was attached to each unit assigned to the operation, after landing, the field directors were assigned on a geographical basis.⁵⁸ Those who set forth from Hawaii were more fortunate than those who came from Guam, for Guam was on an even shorter supply than Hawaii. The movement of supplies and the uncertainty about military plans created some difficulties.⁵⁹ Because of pilferage, the supplies were

⁵⁵ See Appendix E, p. 381 It might be added that none of the clubs in POA had billets and none served full meals. Statistics on the clubs submitted by Miss Smith will be found. in Appendix E, p.381. Lists of the clubs on the several islands is Appendix: F, p. 383. An account of the club program in the South Pacific Area before it became part of the Pacific Ocean Area has been developed in this study, pp. 79-289.

⁵⁶ Admiral Ernest J. King, "U.S. Navy at War, Final Official Report," n.d., p. 8 (Referred to hereafter as "Final Report.")

⁵⁷ "Final Report," p. 7.

⁵⁸ R. R. S., October 1944, referring to the Army Ground Force, APO 86; William P. Hoffmann, Field Director, May 1, 1945. W. A. Myers, Zone Director, to Burran, field director, 3rd Marine Division, December 13, 1944, and Barran to Myers, Dec. 20, 1944; W. R. Benton III to E, Emory Rose, zone dive) May 1)1945.

⁵⁹ W. P. Hoffmann, IT) VAC, to Rose, May 1, 1945; F Burran, PD, 34th Marine Div.) to S. Griffis, Mar. 2, 1945; Howlett to Torrence) Oct. 8, 1944; Hermann, AFD to Torrence; asst. field supervisor) report, Oct. 17, 1944; Myers to Howlett, FD) Oct. 20,1944; Howlett, IT, to commands .g Gen., report, Oct. 310 1944; Howlett to Myers, NO70 16, 1944; Myers to Burran, Nov. 16, 1944; Myers, zone dir., to Burran, FD, Dec. 13, 1944; Burran to Myers, Dec. 15, 1944.

repacked several times, and the code numbers were changed. The convoy from Hawaii stopped at Guam, where the field directors could file messages. They expected that after the battle, the troops would be withdrawn from that position, and consequently requested that the replies be sent to Guam. This expectation was wrong. The troops withdrew to Hawaii, which caused some delay in getting the replies.

Some supplies were lost in landing, more were lost when the quartermaster dump was hit by a shell. However, because the island was small, the field directors could maintain communication with each other and share whatever they had. In one instance, a field director discovered a box containing ocarinas which, he thought, these men with drawn faces and sunken eyes, who had been in combat for almost a week, would refuse. They did not, as the following statement indicates:

As they began to pipe out the halting notes their faces relaxed. Soon they were laughing like school kids over the tunes they were able to coax out of these odd little instruments.

...As dusk settled....the Marines finally dispersed. A half hour later when the supplies had been covered for the night and we were prepared to "sack in", my attention was attracted by the notes of an ocarina. There on a ridge above our camp silhouetted against the twilight sky, stood a lone Marine sentry. During the interludes from screaming shells could be heard the choppy, but strangely sweet strains of "Hark the Herald Angels Sing."⁶⁰

After securing Iwo Jima, the combat troops returned to the island of Hawaii, instead of to Guam, as had been originally planned. Within two weeks the club and recreation department, with the assistance of the officers of the advance echelon, and the base field director, had set up six quonset huts to be used as clubs in strategic areas. When the Marines arrived they found the staff and the clubs in readiness. As they got off their ships they were served coffee, doughnuts, fresh milk, pineapple juice. By truck these Iwo Jima veterans were transported 65 miles to their camp, unaware that Red Cross clubs were awaiting them.⁶¹

A club official who was there said that the men were too shattered to show pleasure.

⁶⁰ F. Burran, FD, to Griffis, Mar. 2, 1945.

⁶¹ When Howard Benton, field supervisor for Iwo Jima, was shown this, he commented that this commendation was well-deserved by all except one member of his staff. This assistant field director had collected supplies to be distributed to the front lines, had then buried them in the volcanic dust, and returned for more: Gen. G. B. Erskine, 3rd Marine Div., to commissioner, Apr. 7, 1945; Gen. G. B. Erskine to Bowen McCoy, dir. of Operations, May 14, 1945; Lt. Com. I. R. M. Shultz to Griffis, Mar. 10, 1945; E. C. Bryant, dir., of Operations, Forward Area, to Leota Kelly, dir., Clubs and Recreation, POA; R. Kelsey, Dir.) Hosp. Service, to R. Corey, dir., Hosp. Service, POA, Mar. 28, 1945; personnel roster, Forward Area May 15, 1945; R. L. Kelsey, asst. dir., Rasp. Service, to R. Corey, dir., Hosp. Service, POA, May 22, 1945; Kelsey to dire, Personnel, POA, June 30, 1945; Corey to Cunningham, asst., hosp. supervisor, Sept. 18, 1945; report, n. sig., Oct. 2, 1945, report, n. sig., Oct. 16, 1945; Cunningham, hosp. supervisor, to Corey., report, Nov. 7, 1945; M. Cunningham, hosp. supervisor, Zone B, to C. F. Rowland, dir., Zone B, Dec. 3, 1945; C. F. Rowland to Jo Vo Powell, Assistant to Zone Director, Zone B, Dec. 10, 1945; Cunningham to Rowland Dec 18, 1945; Rowland to Allen, Dec. 29, 1945; Cunningham to R. C. Irish, personnel supervisor, Zone B, Dec. 31, 1945,

The worst thing our staff had to contend with was the drugged, heavy atmosphere of waiting. Men would take up their posts inside the door of the clubs, outside on the stoop, anywhere where they could watch, just watch hour after hour without saying a word waiting to see if their buddies would come in, or if they had been left behind. There was no expression, there was no conversation. Our girls would slip away to their quarters for a few minutes and literally sob their hearts out from the emotional strain, and then return to the buildings. As the watching gradually was eliminated either through the reunion of men, with much back slapping and exuberance, or because of the realization that someone wasn't coming back, things became somewhat normal after three weeks, and the men became interested in the clubs from all angles. Although their training was intense the buildings were usually crowded. With the arrival of V-J Day and the oft repeated remark "We don't have to be killed any more" the programs really hit the peak in originality and happiness, and continued until the Division was disbanded and the clubs were closed.

Okinawa, April 1, 1945

The landing on Okinawa was a Red Cross operation in which the teams strained so hard for perfection that each was acutely aware of every failure. During the first months after his arrival in Honolulu, Griffis set himself to study what the Red Cross could be expected to do under combat conditions. The planning for the operation had begun in September 1944 when H. Westby-Gibson, who in civilian life had been manager of a finance corporation in New York City, and had come to Honolulu as a special representative of Services to the Armed Forces, undertook the discussion of a program on Okinawa in which the Red Cross would be an integral part of the combat teams. He and Griffis soon concluded that the Red Cross failures in the past had been because the people in the Service had been inadequate as to quality, supplies had been inadequate in quantity, and the timing had been bad.

During the late autumn of 1944 the plan for Okinawa was conceived in an atmosphere of enthusiasm and high promise. The inadequacy of the plan was inevitably the consequence of the conditions of wartime.⁶²

Personnel and Supply

Most of the Red Cross people who landed on Okinawa had to be selected from those in Griffis' theater. Training might improve the quality of their work; support might strengthen the weaker characters, but even if a sufficient number of perfect field directors were available any place in the world, they could not have been transported to the Pacific in time and in sufficient numbers. One difficulty, not foreseen in the days of planning, was that troops were staged not only in Hawaii but in all parts of the Pacific, the United States, and even Europe. Thus, the briefing given the staff of Camp Service in Hawaii

⁶² These notes are based on a paper entitled "Narrative, APO 357," The preface is dated June 1, 1945. The narrative is there attributed to ["Henry Knowlton, assistant field director, Historian."](#) It will be referred to hereafter as "Narrative APO 357." The passages from letters and reports cited by Knowlton have been checked against data in the files of the Historical Division's Pacific Sections and have been found to be accurate and typical statements.

was different from that given the staff in other places. Furthermore, to iron out differences of operation under combat proved difficult.

The field directors who participated in the operation were bitterly disappointed in the method of allocating supplies. In accepting this fact it must be kept in mind that Okinawa and Iwo Jima were being planned at the same time, that the supply officers charged with allocation knew that, very shortly after these islands had been secured, Japan was to be the next step, and that none could anticipate how soon that step was to be taken.

The supplies were packed in standard kits marked with symbols according to their content. The number of kits requisitioned was determined by the number of troops to be served. Despite the high priority given to supply, the Supply Division of the Pacific Ocean Area was generally criticized for its failure to prepare the supplies in time, to get manifests ready, and to mark the packages. Other supplies which were packed in paper cartons were destroyed by water and rain, recreation kits and kits containing inks and paints were broken open, and the entire contents were ruined. Other kits were packed in Leyte by the supply officer of the Southwest Pacific Area who, after three years of campaigning, had learned his lesson. These boxes, standard in size, weighing about 200 pounds each, survived the landing.⁶³

The staffing of the units was done by Westby-Gibson in Honolulu and by Allen Kolb in Tacloban. Although the Red Cross attempted to staff each unit at full strength, i.e., a field director for each division and an assistant field director for each regiment, on the landing day one-fifth of the military units were without Red Cross representation. During the first 14 days, 89 Red Cross men came ashore on Okinawa, the largest number to have participated in any Pacific landing. Moreover, the men who had been assigned to their units earlier had had the opportunity of sharing the final training. On shipboard they had attended the briefing sessions and orientation lectures, and had learned about Okinawa and its people. One month after the landing, the operation was in full swing. Five canteens were serving 20,000 to 45,000 men a day. The Army supplied tents as well as the cooks who provided 7,000 doughnuts a day or, when supplies ran short, 350 loaves of bread. Field directors worked in the clearing stations and hospitals. Three men were

⁶³ "Narrative, APO 357," June 1, 1945. The contents of the kits were:

cigarettes,	50 cartons;	chewing tobacco,	12 plugs;
V-Mail,	3,000 sheets;	envelopes,	500;
soap (laundry)	24 bars;	toothpaste,	100 tubes;
razor blades,	300;	smoking tobacco,	24 packages;
chewing gum,	6 cartons;	writing paper,	1,000 sheets;
soap (face)	144 bars;	toothbrushes,	100;
shaving cream,	100 tubes;	combs,	12

Joe Graham to Stanton Griffis, "ARC Supplies distributed on Okinawa," July 2, 1945. The complete list is:

tropical chocolate,	283,452 bars;	towels,	38,101 each;
mirrors, metal,	8,545 each;	books and magazines,	57,215 each;
books and magazines,	57,215 each;	handkerchiefs,	9,901 each;
chewing gum,	88 100 packs;	candy, hard,	25,632 4-oz packages;
shaving cream,	50,600 tubes;	razors,	46,444 each;
razor blades,	152,087 each;	combs,	36,443 each;
toothbrushes,	41,537 each;	toothpaste,	38,878 tubes;
wash cloths,	22,144 each;	soap, hand,	75,025 cakes;
pencils,	16,504 each;	smoking tobacco,	12,087 packages;
slippers, hospitals,	11,960 pairs;	cards, playing,	15,640 decks,
pipes,	3,588 each;	bedside bags,	1,725 each;
matches,	185,437 packages.		

assigned to a rest camp for combat fatigue cases, which opened on April 15, two weeks after the landing.

Okinawa was declared secure on May 29, 1945. By that time the 255 Red Cross men who were on the island (this was about 130 short of the number authorized) had distributed, among other things, 5,716,000 noteheads, 1,129,000 envelopes, 2,500,000 cigarettes. Women were then allowed to enter the area. The combat operation, transformed to a base operation, was transferred to the jurisdiction of the Red Cross in Manila. Supplies were put ashore for the next step, which, happily, was the occupation of a defeated Japan.

Extent of Red Cross Operations in the Pacific, Autumn of 1945

General MacArthur accepted the Japanese surrender in Yokohama Bay at 9:08 a. m. September 2, Tokyo time, which was September 1, 8:08 a.m. Eastern Standard Time in Washington, D. C.⁵ When the first Red Cross field director landed in Japan with his unit on August 29, Red Cross employees were scattered over a large triangle which ran from Japan southward through all the Philippine Archipelago, New Guinea, and Australia; eastward through the Marshalls and Mariannas to Honolulu, and again southwestward through Guadalcanal to New Zealand. These Red Cross Services were being offered by 2,773 men and women. A month later this number had increased, by new shipments of people who were already at sea on VJ Day, to 3,108.⁶ On that date the Services were principally directed from Manila by Nyles I. Christensen, the director of operations, and from Honolulu by Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, the commissioner. Both in Manila and Honolulu, strenuous attempts were being made to close down operations in the rear areas, including New Guinea, Australia, Noumea, New Zealand, and to reduce operations as military strength declined in the southern Philippines, Guadalcanal, and the Territory of Hawaii. At this moment Okinawa, in a direct line between Manila and Tokyo, was transferred from the Pacific Ocean Area to the Southwest Pacific Area, a move which caused some not very serious confusion because the methods of accounting were different in the two theaters.

Red Cross Services on Okinawa had been planned in Honolulu with the Tenth Army by H. Westby-Gibson, the director of operations for that army.⁷ Most of the base commands on Okinawa had their headquarters on Guam. These were CINCPAC which was Nimitz' Navy Command; FMFPAC or the Fleet Marine Force, responsible for all marine troops; the Marine Air Wings on the island; and the Army Strategical Air Force. Thus, although AFPAC (American Forces, Pacific) had final authority through its headquarters in Manila, the actual details of the Red Cross Services had to be approved by the base commands whose headquarters were elsewhere. Kolb made plans with Westby-Gibson to meet this situation in August and carried them out in September as follows: Red Cross liaison was established as between the several commands on Okinawa, Guam, and Manila; all units moving from Okinawa to Japan, principally the XXIV Corps, were fully staffed from Gibson's group and given 90 days' supplies; and personnel en route, who had been requisitioned by the Pacific Ocean Area, were to be accepted by them and ultimately transferred to the Southwest Pacific Area. The supply situation was confused because the Pacific Ocean Area had cancelled 8,000 tons of supplies awaiting shipment in San Francisco at the end of August. However, because both theaters had a surplus of supplies, difficulties from that source were not serious.⁸ The serious problem came when the Red Cross tried to move people and supplies from Manila into Japan at the time the

⁵ World Almanac, 1947, p. 518.

⁶ These figures were supplied by Grace Mattingly, Office of Reports and Analysis, ARC Reports, Overseas Personnel on Duty and enroute, Aug. 31, 1945 and Sept. 30, 1945, Brogren Reporting Results Analysis Unit files

⁷ See above, p. 321

⁸ Kolb to Christensen, Aug. 21, 1945.

military authorities were moving an entire army, which still had to be alert lest the Japanese play tricks.

Red Cross Services to Liberated Civilians and Prisoners of War

American and other civilians and the prisoners of war were met by the Red Cross at all points on their long journey home. Because the majority of them were expected to pass through Manila, the program there, planned between August 11 and September 1, 1945, and carried out between September 1 and November 30, may be taken as typical. Other Programs, though differing somewhat in detail, were operated on Okinawa, Guam, and in Honolulu. Manila, however, was thought of as the central point. Here, the recovered personnel (including men, women and children) who had spent months or years in Japanese prisons went through the complicated processes necessary to return them to the United States and to citizenship.

The Army and the Red Cross took care in the planning stage of this program to assure themselves that each step was directed toward getting these people back to the United States at the earliest possible moment. Consequently, though plans had been made for Red Cross Canteen Service at the docks, these were changed when it was found that most of the people were being returned by ship instead of by air, and that for these crowds to stop at the docks for refreshment, would delay their transportation to the camps, where they were to stay until they could be moved forward. In this cooperative undertaking, the Army was responsible for getting the people to their camps or hospitals in Manila; for collecting the needed information from them; for feeding, billeting, and clothing them; and finally for getting them out of Manila on their next step. The Red Cross was responsible for registering them and getting next-of-kin messages to them, for operating Canteen and Recreation Services in co-operation with the Army, for the distribution of comfort items, and for conducting welfare services.

As soon as the recovered personnel reached Manila, they were sent to hospitals or camps. Five hospitals were available: one for the United States Navy and for civilians, two for the United States Army and for civilians, a fourth for the British and Australians who were recovered, and a fifth for women and children. Three replacement depots were cleared of the men then in them and made available to soldiers and civilians coming in from Japan. General officers were billeted in apartment hotels in Manila. The camps were organized on a battalion basis, each battalion providing its own billets, latrines, showers, 24-hour-a-day messing facilities, dispensary, barber shop, free post exchange. The canteens and lounges in each battalion were furnished and staffed by the Red Cross. The original plan to keep the canteens and lounges open 24 hours a day had to be abandoned because some men would stay in them until 2 or 3 in the morning and others would come in at 5 or 5:30. Because the original Red Cross staff was insufficient to maintain service on this scale, the hours of the workers were arranged so that the rooms could be kept open from 8 in the morning to 11 at night. Each night after closing, the cleaning staff moved in. They had hardly time enough, however, when the simultaneous arrival of the recovered personnel, and the typhoons of that year, made a hasty scrubbing out twice a day necessary.

The Red Cross lounge in each battalion was the registration point for all the men in the battalion. Copies of their cards, sent to the field director for the camp and to the central office in Manila, made the distribution of mail possible.

The Red Cross provided doughnuts and cookies delivered fresh daily from its central commissary in Manila. Coffee and tea were made in the canteens. The post exchanges frequently enabled the Red Cross workers to serve fruit juices and cordials. Between September 8 and November 18 food served in the three depots reached astronomical proportions:

602,400	doughnuts
1,482,500	cookies
17,850	lbs. coffee
21,800	lbs. sugar
20,448	cans evaporated milk

The Red Cross put great emphasis on getting the recovered prisoners of war and civilians in touch with their families as a part of its interest in maintaining soldiers' communications. All mail and messages sent to these people in care of the American Red Cross were received in a message center at the theater headquarters, where the central locator file for the theater, including Guam and Saipan, was also maintained, together with the army rosters from the camps and hospitals. The first 2,500 official next-of-kin messages collected by Red Cross chapters in the United States reached Manila on August 26, 1945. These were followed by later lots of 2,500 to 3,000, until more than 11,000 had arrived. Early in September several sacks arrived with letters which the International Red Cross forwarded but was unable to deliver. Three cases of British mail, with letters dating as far back as 1942, arrived near the end of September 1945. The Red Cross delivered five-eighths of the letters and messages addressed to Americans; one-fifth of those for the British, Australians, and Canadians, and about one-tenth of those for the Dutch.

Field directors made welfare case work, financial aid, and personal services available in each camp to all nationals whose own governments were unable to provide them. Financial aid was given in terms of need, by field directors who were aware of the circumstances of each case. In 13 cases the aid was in the form of loans, making a total of \$520, but in 875 other cases it was written off as a Red Cross grant. Because the Army had arranged to give the prisoners of war a sufficient part of their pay to get them home, most of the grants were made to American civilians. This came to a total of \$4,758 for 610 individuals. In addition, 194 military personnel received \$1,541.15. The total cost of these grants was \$6,871.15. They were made to representatives of 10 nations including, of course, the United States.

Because theater headquarters for the Red Cross in the Southwest Pacific Area in Manila had become a policy-making office, the services for recovered personnel were technically operated by the Red Cross headquarters for the Manila Area (Base X). Actually, all the Red Cross employees on the base, whether attached to headquarters or to the base, or awaiting transportation home, or awaiting assignment, donated their "free" days and their evenings. As many as 47 people were formally assigned to the program. More than a hundred participated in it in some capacity. On November 18, 1945, 31,788

people had passed through the depots and hospitals, and 4,361 were still waiting to be disposed of.⁹

The speed with which these services were planned, and the effectiveness with which they were operated, were evidence that the Red Cross had learned much since 1942. A part of the success of the program may be attributed to the fact that the Red Cross people were on the spot where they were needed, as they too often had not been during earlier years. A greater part of the success, however, must be attributed to the experience these people had had during the years of jungle-fighting and island-hopping.

From a group of civilians who were amazed and immobilized when the military mind changed its plans, as it often did, and for reasons which must always be obscure to the people in charge of actual operations, the Red Cross in this theater had become a pliant, mobile, and ingenious army, clearly aware of its purposes and functions, able to explain them to the military in such a way that the military could cooperate, and alert to seize every advantage which might help it in reaching its objective of service to the armed forces.

Communications

When Japan capitulated, the homesickness which for years had been endemic became epidemic. While the fighting had still been going on, there was either no chance of getting home, or, even if there was a legitimate excuse, the officers had some justification for refusing requests. After the fighting stopped, the men in foreign service and their families inquired in loud and persistent language why they were being kept week after week in hot sticky camps with nothing to do. This had two consequences in terms of Red Cross Services: first, the need to improve the service for communications between servicemen and their families became an urgent necessity, and, second, the shortness of help hampered the work. The discharge of people who had had some experience in the handling of these matters, the assignment to strategic centers of persons without experience, and the actual reduction of the staff in such centers from time to time, made a situation, which was never satisfactory, even worse than it had been, and that at a time when it should have become better.

Until VJ Day, though some ingenious field directors found means to circumvent the regulations, the official method of sending welfare messages from the Southwest Pacific Area to the United States was through military channels. This meant that the field directors from all that part of the Pacific, which was included administratively in the Southwest Pacific Area, sent their messages by radio, air, or safe-hand courier to the theater headquarters. Until these headquarters were moved to Manila, messages from Leyte had to be sent all the way to Brisbane or, for a few months, to Hollandia. After Japan was occupied, they had to be sent through clogged channels to Manila. When such messages arrived at theater headquarters, a vast amount of clerical work was needed, first

⁹ The basic document for this account is Sara T. DeLaney's report "American Red Cross Service to the Recovered Personnel Program," dated Oct. 1945 though written sometime later. An earlier report, Sept. 3, 1945, covers the planning period. Jane Betterly reported these plans to Brig. Gen. Baird on Aug. 14, 1945. A "Summary Report of Red Cross Operations, Okinawa Evacuated POW Area Sept.-October, 1945," by Monroe Sweetland, asst. field supervisor, covers services on Okinawa. Between Sept. 2 and Oct. 15, 22,650 people passed through this station, mostly by air, on their way to the U.S.A.

to screen them, then to send confirmatory messages, and, as field directors were not always adept at translating facts into telegraphese, to rewrite them. Although, shortly after the capitulation, commercial cables became available which would have enabled the field directors to communicate directly with the chapters, they could not be used except by prior clearance with national headquarters. Complaints about poor service filled the reports and letters.¹⁰

The situation became so acute in September that Edna Mattox, assistant national director of Home Service, came to Manila. The system adopted was decentralization. Instead of sending all messages to theater headquarters, the field directors were instructed to send them to the message centers in the headquarters of the several areas. Other reforms were instituted, of which the most important were: that field offices were to send messages to the centers in the bases in such a form that they could be relayed to Washington without censoring or editing; that the field directors would keep the message centers informed of the movement of military units, reducing the amount of hunting necessary to find the addressees; and that the locator file of the Army and the Red Cross would be improved.¹¹

In the single month of November the message center handled 9,471 messages. Decentralization produced some improvement of service. In December 1945 the welfare supervisor in Tokyo reported that every welfare office in Japan and Korea was on a direct series to Washington. In one instance messages made the round trip in six days, but the general average was still two to three weeks.¹² In January 1946 the communications officers were still dissatisfied. Whereas a month earlier the round trip of messages originating in the Far East was 15.6 days, in January it was 23.2 days. Elimination of clerical work enabled the centers to dispose of all messages the day they arrived, but delays still occurred in the Army's Signal Service which held messages from 1 to 12 days before sending them out; they were held in the office of the Red Cross communications officer and in Home Service in Washington.¹³ A year later (by January 1947) the service

¹⁰ Complaints: welfare summary report from area dir., Mar. 24; 1945; F. A. Fedor, FD, narrative report, July 1945, dated Aug. 4, 1945; Knowlton, FD, Aug. 20, 1945; report, dir., Camp Welfare, Sept. 1945; report, hosp. recreation worker, dir. of Hosp. Service, Sept. 1945; report, actg. FD to area welfare supervisor Sept. 1945; report, Knowlton, Sept. 1945; report, n. sig., Oct. 1945; T. M. Dinsmore to Aim. Andrews, Oct. 8, 1945; report, n. sig., Nov. 1945; H. A. Sanderson to Jerry Bryan, Nov. 3, 1945; report, n. sig., Dec. 1945; monthly report, welfare supervisor, Dec. 1945; report, n. sig., Jan. 1946; report, chief of signal center, Jan. 1946; report, senior FD, Jan. 1946; report, dir. to area recreation supervisor, Jan. 1946; report, n. sig., Feb. 1946; report, FD, Feb. 20, 1946; report, n. sig., Mar. 1946; report, FD, to welfare supervisor, Mar. 20, 1946; Albert J. Dombrowsky to Eaton, report, Mar. 23, 1946; report, AFD, to welfare supervisor, Apr. 20, 1946; report, supervisor, Camp Service, to asst. dir. of Operations, Apr. 20, 1946; report, AFD to welfare supervisor, May 1946; report, chief of communications center, May 20, 1946; report, AFD to hosp. supervisor, June 1946; report, AFD, to hosp. supervisor, July 1946; report, FD to supervisor, Camp Welfare Service, Aug. 1946. Reports of improved services are: check sheet to Maj. Gen. Akin, chief, signal officer, Aug. 10, 1945; report, n. sig., Aug. 25, 1945; report, AFD, to area welfare supervisor, Sept. 1945; report, AFD, Sept. 20, 1945; report, n. sig., Sept. 21, 1945; report, n. sig., Dec. 1945; report, welfare supervisor, Dec. 1945; report, area dir. to commanding officer, Base 141, Dec. 1, 1945; report, field supervisor, Jan. 1946; report, n. sig., Jan. 1946; report, chief, signal communications center, Jan. 1946; report, area dir. to commanding officer, Base M Jan. 1, 1946; report, n. sig., Feb. 1946; report, n. sig., Mar. 1946; report, FD to welfare supervisor, Mar. 19, 1946; report, n. sig., May 1946; Butler report, May 20, 1946; report, FD, May 22, 1946; report, AFD to hosp. supervisor, June 1946; report, AFD, June 17, 1946; report, AFD, June 20, 1946; report, June 20, 1946; report, AFD, to camp supervisor, June 20, 1946; report, AFD to hosp. supervisor, July 1946; report, n. sig., July 1946; report, AFD to welfare supervisor, Aug. 1946.

¹¹ William F. Barrow, chief, Signal Communications Center, Area X (Manila), "Monthly Report for 20 October 1945- 20 November 1945"; Edna Mattox to Sterling Johnson, "Report of Visit to Headquarters Southwest Pacific Theater, 9/21/45 through 10/10/45,"

¹² Welfare supervisor, "Monthly Report," APO 500, Dec. 1945.

¹³ Monthly report, chief, Signal Communications Center, Manila, Jan. 1946.

had improved to the point where replies for 58 percent of the messages were received in Japan within three days.¹⁴ One happy note was struck when the field director attached to the 136th Regimental Combat Team in Japan was able to report that information on furloughs granted by The Adjutant General's Office in Washington reached him a few days to three weeks ahead of the actual receipt of the War Department order by the regimental personnel officers.¹⁵

The Move Into Japan

The move into Japan was a hazardous military operation. Although the Japanese had given assurance that their troops were disarmed, the members of the 11th Airborne Division who arrived at Atsugi Air field between Tokyo and Yokohama on August 29 1945, were sharply aware of the fact that here was a small number of American armed men surrounded by millions of people who until two weeks ago had been determined to exterminate them. The first Red Cross man to reach Japan came with these forces. He was John Butler, the director of Camp Service. Like many a field director of the rugged days of 1942, he smuggled himself in without official sanction and with no military orders. On September 2 two others from Camp Service arrived, this time officially. By September 3 they had opened a canteen at Atsugi to care for the prisoners of war who were being evacuated by air. Their equipment was one weapon's carrier with comfort articles, and one thermos jug.¹⁶ On September 4, these two men, together with others who had arrived that day, opened a field office in downtown Yokohama and began a club in a former restaurant building.¹⁷ The occupation of Japan was an enormous operation which required the movement of¹⁸ one-third of a million troops, with their equipment, into a nation of sixty million inhabitants. Such confusions and misunderstandings as arose were trifling when set against the size of the problem solved. Two minor difficulties may be worth mentioning. The occupation was carried out by two armies, one corps, and the general headquarters. One army based in Yokohama, 20 miles south of Tokyo, was responsible for eastern and northern Japan including Tokyo; the second at Kyoto was responsible for western Japan and the corps was responsible for Korea. The general headquarters were based in Tokyo. Inasmuch as all available space for billets and offices would be needed in Tokyo for the staff of the general headquarters, the question arose as to how the units of the Eighth Army in Yokohama and the Red Cross people attached to them could meet their obligations in Tokyo without tiresome commuting. After everybody conferred, compromises were reached.

The second difficulty came from an error in requisitioning space for a Red Cross headquarters in Tokyo. For reasons which were never made clear, the Army was under the impression that the Red Cross would need office space in Tokyo for only two officials. Inasmuch as the service heads who constituted the Red Cross staff at the theater

¹⁴ Carl E. Barch to M. Mongelli, chief, Corres, Unit, Home Service, Feb, 24, 1947.

¹⁵ Report, Reg. HQ, - 136 ROT, 33rd Div., APO 33, Jan., 1946.

¹⁶ Rpt., Carl Plate, asst. field supervisor, to Roger Leathers, asst. field supervisor, Sept. 1945.

¹⁷ Jameson, "Field Notes," Dec. 13, 1945.

¹⁸ On Oct. 31, 1945, 362,865 soldiers were in Japan: Army Strength Report STM-30, W13202 OMO. This does not include sailors and marines.

headquarters had to be constantly available to their opposites in the Army to iron out difficulties and facilitate service, the space originally allotted them was inadequate. The consequence was that for the first few months of the occupation the Red Cross staff attached to headquarters, as well as the staff operating the clubs and field director stations in Tokyo, was scattered throughout the area.¹⁹

Because the problems the Red Cross faced in Japan were variants under happier conditions of problems they had been grappling with for years, the Services were quickly established. For the first time since the beginning of hostilities, the Army could assign the Red Cross the transportation it needed. As the Army was aware of the fact that servicemen in a strange country would become restless and morose unless well entertained, both Special Services and the Red Cross exercised strenuous efforts to get the recreation program started at the earliest possible moment. By the end of September many of the 89 clubs and canteens then operating in the Southwest Pacific were closing, but at the same time the Club and Recreation Division of the Red Cross was blueprinting its plans for Japan. These plans looked toward the establishments of three railroad station canteens, additional air strip canteens which would be opened as the traffic warranted, seven additional off-post clubs in western Japan, and other facilities, all to be operated by 161 American employees of the Red Cross and 1,500 civilian employees.²⁰ Two months later, almost 100 clubs or canteens were either in operation or being planned.²¹ These were varied in architecture, size, and service. Until the capitulation, the Bankers Club in Tokyo had been what its name implies. After the capitulation it became a serviceman's club. Here the Red Cross offered every type of club service, except billets, which the ingenious minds of program directors could devise. The 7th Cavalry Club outside of Tokyo, a modern building with all facilities, had been used by Japanese officers during the fighting. A former imperial yacht at the docks of Tokyo was taken over for the First Cavalry. In the camps away from Tokyo, the clubs were temporary buildings thrown up by the Army or former warehouses and local hotels. One bit of Red Cross luck in Yokohama was in getting a very large cookie factory assigned to them for operation. Another type of operation was the rest homes. The Miyanashita Hotel on the side of Jujiyama was designated as a rest home for officers. In these places the Red Cross began the exploration of a form of service which 1½ years later became the standard form of Red Cross recreation. Here and in other rest areas, instead of taking complete responsibility for the operation of the hotel, the Red Cross contented itself with assigning women who acted as hostesses and organized recreation programs.

¹⁹ Jameson, "Field Notes," Dec. 9, 1945.

²⁰ Hugh T. Henry, "Survey and estimate of club and recreation facilities required for permanent recreation program in Japan," Sept. 27, 1945.

²¹ "Survey of Sixth Army Clubs and Recreation Facilities in South Honshu and Kyushu," Nov. 20, 1945; "Survey of Eighth Army Club and Recreation Facilities in North Honshu and Hokkaido," Nov. 20, 1945. The number of clubs and canteens actually listed, in these surveys is 111. The author has reduced the number to "almost 100" because when he was there in Dec. he visited all of them and some of these listed were still being built.